Collaboration and Competition in Two Colonization Projects

Toward a General Theory of Official Corruption

Dados Bibliográficos

ID2498960
AutoresStephen G Bunker (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign), Stephen Bunker (0000-0003-0780-4784), L Cohen (0000-0002-0112-8642, The University of Texas at Austin)
Ano1983
Volume42
Fascículo2
Páginas106-114
Data de publicação1983-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoHuman Organization (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0018-7259 • E-ISSN: 1938-3517
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.17730/humo.42.2.a152847m73542801
OpenAlexW2087504209
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas10
Referências citadas21

The development of efficient and honest bureaucracies has long been a central concern in studies of organizations, but there is little theory to explain the emergence of corruption in bureaucracies. Analyses of this type of corruption in underdeveloped countries have frequently attributed causation to particular political, cultural, or social-structural factors, without taking into account different degrees of corruption in highly different frames. In this study, we propose that the degree of antagonistic surveillance or collaborative exchange within and between bureaucratic agencies is a key determinant of the incidence of official corruption. Two development projects within the same geographical, political, administrative and temporal frames in a single developing country are compared in order to examine this proposition. Our analysis of rural development projects along the Transamazon Highway in Brazil indicates that antagonism between agents of different bureaucratic agencies serves to reduce corruption by ensuring the mutual vigilance of the actors involved, and by preventing the opportunities for collusion or acquiescence that are necessary for corruption to occur. The generalizability of this proposition beyond developing countries is considered, and policy implications are discussed

Acquiescence · Bureaucracy · Collusion · Developing country · Development economics · Economic growth · Economics · Generalizability theory · Language change · Political corruption · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Corruption and Economic Development · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Economic Growth and Development