De la Critique de la Mesure des Sensations au Problème Philosophique de la Liberté Humaine

This article attempts to show that, in opposition to analytical and phenomenological traditions, when Bergson examines the epistemological problem of the measurement of sensations, he tries to connect it with the philosophical question of human freedom, which science cannot solve. It is not possible to conclude that every philosophical problem is a scientific problem. But philosophy does not come first. It needs an indirect approach and a metaphorical language. As Bergson says, intuition is riding intelligence. The problem of measuring sensation concerns the difficulty of establishing sensation as a mental object or a representation that can be compared or distinguished from others. What sensation does is not separate from what it does to us. It is not only something thought, it is something lived and connected with duration, like human freedom, which is nothing but a specific feeling. This living is not a phenomenological illusion, it is a naturalistic puzzle. If we take the Bergsonian conclusion, sensation is simply a spiritualistic reality. We contest this dual approach, but we try to separate this wrong solution from the very accurate puzzle that Bergson presents us with

Cognitive psychology · Conscience · Epistemology · Feeling · Humanities · Illusion · Intuition · Nothing · Sensation · Historical and Scientific Studies · Neurology and Historical Studies · Philosophical and Theoretical Analysis · Philosophy · Psychology

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