Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate Performance
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 3210871 |
|---|---|
| Autores | John M Abowd (0000-0002-0998-4531, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 1990 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 52-S-73-S |
| Data de publicação | 1990-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Industrial and Labor Relations Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0019-7939 • E-ISSN: 2162-271X |
| Editora | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/001979399004300304 |
| OpenAlex | W1972018654 |
| ISBN | 9793990043003 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 17 |
| Referências citadas | 31 |
The author, using 1981–86 data on more than 16,000 managers at 250 large corporations, investigates whether the sensitivity of managerial compensation to corporate performance in one year is positively related to corporate performance in the next year. Accounting-based measures of performance yield only weak evidence of such an association, but economic and market measures yield stronger evidence. Payment of an incremental 10% bonus for good economic performance is associated with a 30 to 90 basis point increase in the expected after-tax gross economic return in the following fiscal year; and payment of an incremental raise of 10% following a good stock market performance is associated with a 400 to 1200 basis point increase in expected total shareholder return
Actuarial science · Affect (linguistics) · Basis point · Bond · Business · Compensation (psychology) · Corporate governance · Economics · Executive compensation · Fiscal year · Monetary economics · Payment · Point (geometry) · Shareholder · Yield (engineering) · Accounting · Accounting and Organizational Management · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance · Communication · Corporate Finance and Governance · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Finance · Psychology · Risk Management in Financial Firms · Social Psychology
Behind the rising meritocracy
Careers Inside Organizations
Modes of Theorizing in Strategic Human Resource Management
High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Capitalist forms and the essence of capitalism
ESG pay and corporate social irresponsibility
Too Much Pay-Performance Sensitivity
Liquidity Shocks, Security Design and Organizational Change
R&D Investment, Executive Incentive, and Financial Performance in GEM
How redistributive institutions affect pay inequality and heterogeneity among top managers
Gender Earnings Differentials in Total Pay, Base Pay, and Contingent Pay
Pension Portability and Labor Market Efficiency
Moral Hazard and Observability
Salaries and Piece Rates
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Agency Problems and Residual Claims
The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions
Theory of the firm
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
Why Is There Mandatory Retirement
Executive Compensation in Large Industrial Corporations
Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers
Executive Pay and Firm Performance
| Obras citantes distintas | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,53 |
| Intervalo de citações | 1994 - 2025 (32) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 15 |