Hegel's Critique of Liberal Theories of Rights

Dados Bibliográficos

ID3300693
AutoresPeter G Stillman (Vassar College, autor correspondente)
Ano1974
Volume68
Fascículo3
Páginas1086-1092
Data de publicação1974-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/1959149
OpenAlexW2122716388
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas5
Referências citadas17

In "Abstract Right," the first part of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel criticizes the usual content and formulations of liberal theories of rights. In terms of content, Hegel argues that the subject of rights is only a narrow abstraction from the full human being; that he has limited self-determination and limited political freedom; and that, when he acts on his rights, he produces terror and destruction. In terms of formulations, Hegel argues that the pervasiveness of contract relations is inaccurate and undesirable; that the state cannot be derived from the natural man's alienating his right to punish; and that it is inaccurate to conceptualize civil society as only limiting natural man's freedoms. By transforming natural to abstract rights, Hegel retains much of the substance of rights, while concurrently preparing for the later sections of his text which try to overcome the inadequacies of a political theory based only on rights

Epistemology · Hegelianism · Human rights · Law and economics · Natural (archaeology · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Subject (documents · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics