Arms Control Verification and Other Games Involving Imperfect Detection

Dados Bibliográficos

ID3348914
AutoresDonald Wittman (0000-0002-1073-4345, University of California, Santa Cruz, autor correspondente)
Ano1989
Volume83
Fascículo3
Páginas923-945
Data de publicação1989-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/1962067
OpenAlexW2122185521
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas8
Referências citadas5

This article presents an analysis of the strategic behavior of countries when there is imperfect verification of an arms control agreement. It provides a framework for determining whether an arms control agreement is desirable, shows which factors are needed for the agreement to be maintained in the absence of third-party enforcers, and develops propositions relating changes in verification capabilities to changes in the likelihood of cheating and the use of verification technology. These propositions yield several paradoxes of information (for example, the better the verification technology, the less often it will be employed). Since the analysis incorporates both simultaneous and sequential moves by the players, it provides new insights into other applied areas as well as game theory

Arms control · Cheating · Computer security · Control (management · Economics · Game theory · Imperfect · Mathematical economics · Perfect information · Political science · Yield (engineering · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology