Lamps, Rainbows and Horizons

In the present essay I address the apparently problematic status of epistemology in F.W.J. Schelling's work. Given the (at times) overblown emphasis on Schelling's anti-Kantianism, there would seem to be little hope in articulating anything like a theory of knowledge in Schelling's thought. For the sake of brevity I emphasize knowledge's spatial and navigational functions in Schelling's texts. For Schelling, the navigational is that which locates, and constructively constrains, the capacity of the subject to synthesize. This is accomplished, I argue, via a spatialized reading of Schelling's concept of intellectual intuition. While this form of intuition initially resembles that of Fichte's, Schelling transforms the term, using it in tandem with construction, in order to maintain both the sensory immediacy, yet abstract form, of intuition as the initial means a knowing subject, immersed in the activities of nature, comes to recognize its own capacities and begins to form claims about the world

Epistemology · Immediacy · Intuition · Sociology · Subject (documents · Computer Science · Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Psychoanalysis and Social Critique · Philosophy

• Wandering Significance

  Mark Wilson•Wandering significance•2006

  Incluir item

• Critique of Pure Reason

  Open Access•Immanuel Kant, G Banham et al.•Critique of Pure Reason, Second…•2007

  Incluir item

• On the History of Modern Philosophy

  Open Access•Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von Schelling, Andrew Bowie•On the History of Modern Philosophy•1994

  Incluir item

• Schelling's Organic Form of Philosophy

  Bruce Matthews•Schelling's organic form of…•2011

  Incluir item

• "The "eternal and necessary bond between Philosophy and Physics

  Iain Hamilton Grant•Angelaki•2005

  Incluir item