On resistance

Along with fundamental rights such as liberty and property, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789 also envisions a right to resist oppression. Irrespective of one's place on the political spectrum, resistance has been employed as an alternative both to submission and to revolt. After briefly sketching a historical and theoretical account of resistance I propose two parallel sets of criteria to further characterize good resistance. I submit that the first set is normative (I call it emancipatory) and the second set is critical (meaning it can be empirically assessed). I further break this typology down as follows: (1) Resistance is emancipatory when it is (a) nonviolent, (b) progressive, and (c) civil; and (2) it is critical when it seeks to (a) change policies and practices that are unjust, and (b) empower citizens to enjoy their full rights. I show the usefulness of this scheme by applying it to the political situation in Iran and by evincing these criteria in three instances of resistance there. Thus, in this context, I argue, resistance is a preferable alternative to both revolution and reform

Context (archaeology · Declaration · Epistemology · Law and economics · Meaning (existential · Normative · Oppression · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Resistance (ecology · Sociology · Typology · History · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Religion and Society Interactions · War, Ethics, and Justification

• Critical Resistance

  David Couzens Hoy•Critical Resistance•2004

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• The Green's Non‐Violent Ethos

  Open Access•Omid Payrow Shabani•Constellations•2013

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