Why share? An analysis of the sources of post-conflict power-sharing

Dados Bibliográficos

ID3917066
AutoresWilliam G Nomikos (0000-0003-2054-8359, Washington University in St. Louis, autor correspondente)
Ano2021
Volume58
Fascículo2
Páginas248-262
Data de publicação2021-03-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Peace Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022343320929732
OpenAlexW3093257355
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas8
Referências citadas41

Why do former belligerents institutionalize power-sharing arrangements after a civil war ends? The choice of power-sharing institutions shapes the nature of governance in many post-conflict settings. A better understanding of how belligerents come to choose institutionalized forms of power-sharing would thus help us explain how belligerents come to make a seemingly simple institutional choice that may have immense consequences. Existing scholarship emphasizes the nature of the conflict preceding negotiations, international actors, or state institutional capacity as critical factors for determining whether former belligerents will agree to share power or not. Yet these accounts overlook the importance of political considerations between and within ethnic groups. This article argues that elites create power-sharing institutions when the most significant threat to their political power comes from an outside group as opposed to from within their own group. That is, forward-looking and power-minded leaders of former belligerents push for the type of power-sharing at the negotiating table that affords them the greatest opportunity to influence country-level politics after the conflict has concluded in full. For elites facing competition from outside, this means securing power-sharing through institutional rules and guidelines in the settlement of the civil war to ensure that they are included in the governance of the state. By contrast, for elites fearing in-group rivals, complex governance institutions are at best unnecessary and, at worst, a significant concession to weaker opponents. I test the argument with a cross-national analysis of an original dataset of 186 power-sharing negotiations from 1945-2011. The empirical analysis suggests that elites are most likely to institutionalize power-sharing when no single ethnic group dominates politics and when most ethnic groups are unified. The quantitative analysis is complemented with illustrative examples from cases of power-sharing negotiations that offer insight into the proposed theoretical mechanisms

Argument (complex analysis) · Corporate governance · Economics · Law and economics · Negotiation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics) · Power sharing · Scholarship · Sociology · State (computer science) · International Development and Aid · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance