Ultimate Concessions? Why States Agree to Independence Referendums After Long Wars

Dados Bibliográficos

ID3948283
AutoresKentaro Fujikawa (0000-0002-3795-4807, Nagoya University, autor correspondente)
Ano2025
Volume31
Fascículo2
Páginas1-27
Data de publicação2025-06-23
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoGeopolitics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1465-0045 • E-ISSN: 1557-3028
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/14650045.2025.2516643
OpenAlexW4411570495
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas40

Governments that fiercely and violently fight against self-determination movements rarely accommodate the latter’s demand for independence referendums subsequently. However, rare exceptions exist where governments eventually agree to independence referendums. Why do governments radically change their policies and offer these ultimate concessions? To answer this question, this article analyses five such cases: Western Sahara, Eritrea, East Timor, Bougainville, and Southern Sudan. It argues that both (1) motivations (why the government is in need of an agreement with a self-determination movement), and (2) justifications (why the government is willing to accept a solution that could lead to the loss of what it considers is part of its territory) are necessary for this outcome, and it identifies three motivations and three justifications that would buttress ultimate concessions. It contends that different combinations of these motivations and justifications can lead to the government’s acceptance of an independence referendum after a long self-determination conflict

Economics · Political economy · Political science · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Political Conflict and Governance · Political Systems and Governance