Deconstructive vs Pragmatic

A Critique of the Derrida-Searle Debate

Dados Bibliográficos

ID3969989
AutoresPeter Bornedal (Departments of Philosophy and Cultural Studies, American University of Beirut, Bliss Street, Ras Beirut 1107-2020, Beirut, Lebanon, autor correspondente)
Ano2020
Volume25
Fascículo1
Páginas62-81
Data de publicação2020-01-02
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe European Legacy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1084-8770 • E-ISSN: 1470-1316
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/10848770.2019.1652039
OpenAlexW2969996877
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas32

This article presents a critical account of the debate between Derrida and Searle in which I defend Austin’s and Searle’s pragmatic analysis of speech against Derrida’s complex deconstructionist approach. I first formalize Derrida’s argument, reducing it to its main tenets that can be positively identified and critically reviewed. On the basis of this formalization I argue that the apparent incompatibility between Derrida’s and Searle’s approach to language becomes clear once we formalize, according to their type and content, the three concepts of “intention” that are confusedly referred to under one and the same label in the debate. This formalization reduces and clarifies the obscurity associated with the Derrida–Searle debate, and helps demonstrating the shortcomings of Derrida’s position

Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications