The Uses of Thought and Will

I offer a reading of the role of freedom in Descartes’ Meditations and other writings that sees freedom’s role in “assenting to ideas” as a matter of psychological possibility, and its role in action as governed by epistemic norms. The will has two constitutive aspects, for Descartes: there are volitions that terminate in the soul, and volitions that terminate in the body. When these two aspects, the input and output sides (in Paul Hoffman’s phrase), harmonize, the result is an expression of free agency. I argue that Descartes holds that norms exist only where there is some responsibility to live up to (or fail by), rather than there being any normative standard antecedently given in nature, and that this makes the matter of governing our own freedom all the more pressing. Descartes’ central concern in this area is to locate a way of coping with inevitable ignorance and uncertainty, and I discuss the elements of how he proposes that we do so. I argue also that there is a great deal of continuity between Descartes’ counsel on how to believe and on how to act, and that Cartesian practical philosophy is a coherent continuation of the project of the Meditations

Epistemology · Free will · Ignorance · Normative · Sociology · Soul · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought

• Descartes’s theory of free will and inference to the best explanation

  Ayumu Tamura•Intellectual History Review•2025

  Incluir item

• In Contradiction

  Graham Priest•In contradiction•2006

  Incluir item

• Descartes

  Margaret D Wilson, Bernard Williams•The Journal of Philosophy•1979

  Incluir item

• Form, Substance, and Mechanism

  Robert Pasnau•The Philosophical Review•2004

  Incluir item

• Freedom and strength of will

  Open Access•Paul Hoffman•Philosophical Studies•1995

  Incluir item