Sunk in the Sahara

The Applicability of the Sunk Cost Effect to Irredentist Disputes

Dados Bibliográficos

ID3978481
AutoresKarin Von Hippel (King's College Hospital, autor correspondente)
Ano1996
Volume1
Fascículo1
Páginas95-116
Data de publicação1996-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Journal of North African Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1362-9387 • E-ISSN: 1743-9345
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13629389608718267
OpenAlexW2028771879
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas5
Referências citadas17

The sunk cost effect describes the inability of decision makers to abandon chosen courses of action even when the costs outweigh the gains, potential or real. An examination of the background to the Western Sahara conflict suggests that Morocco has been victim to the sunk cost effect, even though the monarchy might not be able nor wish to abandon its policy after so many years' commitment. The Moroccan experience is contrasted with some other well‐known cases of the sunk cost effect in contemporary international relations and mechanisms are suggested for avoiding it, even to the extent of intensifying commitments in order to bring the situation to a definitive conclusion

Action (physics · Economics · Microeconomics · Monarchy · Order (exchange · Political science · Politics · Sunk costs · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · International Development and Aid · Law · Natural Resources and Economic Development