An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 4029342 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Robert V Gibbons (0000-0002-3368-6542, National Bureau of Economic Research, autor correspondente), Robert Gibbons (0000-0001-6765-3039, Charles Dyson Professor of Economics and Organizations, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.) |
| Ano | 1997 |
| Volume | 11 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 127-149 |
| Data de publicação | 1997-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Journal of Economic Perspectives (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0895-3309 • E-ISSN: 1944-7965 |
| Editora | American Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1257/jep.11.1.127 |
| OpenAlex | W2035148334 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 19 |
| Referências citadas | 20 |
This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. The author gives simple definitions and intuitive examples of four kinds of games and their corresponding solution concepts: Nash equilibrium in static games of complete information; subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete (or 'private') information; and perfect Bayesian (or sequential) equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information. The main theme of the paper is that there are important differences among the games but important similarities among the solution concepts
Bayesian game · Best response · Complete information · Economics · Epsilon-equilibrium · Equilibrium selection · Extensive-form game · Game theory · Implementation theory · Markov perfect equilibrium · Mathematical economics · Nash equilibrium · Repeated game · Sequential equilibrium · Sequential game · Solution concept · Subgame · Subgame perfect equilibrium · Trembling hand perfect equilibrium · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
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| Obras citantes distintas | 19 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,63 |
| Intervalo de citações | 1996 - 2026 (31) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 17 |