The Job Market for New Economists

A Market Design Perspective

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4029697
AutoresPeter Cole (0000-0003-2637-5014), Peter Coles (0000-0002-5535-2850, Assistant Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts.), John Cawley (0000-0002-4805-9883, Associate Professor of Policy Analysis and Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.), Phillip B Levine (0000-0001-7374-3823, Professor of Economics, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Massachusetts.), Muriel Niederle (0000-0002-4955-2186, Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California.), Alvin E Roth (0000-0002-8834-6481, Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.), John J Siegfried (Professor of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, and Senior Research Fellow, University of Adelaide, South Australia.)
Ano2010
Volume24
Fascículo4
Páginas187-206
Data de publicação2010-11-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Journal of Economic Perspectives (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0895-3309 • E-ISSN: 1944-7965
EditoraAmerican Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1257/jep.24.4.187
OpenAlexW2133813601
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas8
Referências citadas16

This paper, written by the members of the American Economic Association (AEA) Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, provides an overview of the market for new Ph.D. economists. It describes the role of the AEA in the market and focuses in particular on two mechanisms adopted in recent years at the suggestion of our Committee. First, job market applicants now have a signaling service to send an expression of special interest to up to two employers prior to interviews at the January Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA) meetings. Second, the AEA now invites candidates who are still on the market, and employers whose positions are still vacant, to participate in a web-based "scramble" to reduce search costs and thicken the late part of the job market. We present statistics on the activity in these market mechanisms and present survey evidence that both mechanisms have facilitated matches. The paper concludes by discussing the emergence of platforms for transmitting job market information and other design issues that may arise in the market for new economists

Business · Economics · Factor market · Job market · Market analysis · Market economy · Nonmarket forces · Auction Theory and Applications · Engineering · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Marketing