Neo-Conventionalist Accounts of Necessity
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 4079293 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Cansu Yüksel (0000-0003-4967-931X, King's College London, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2024 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Fascículo | 11 |
| Data de publicação | 2024-11-01 |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.70010 |
| OpenAlex | W4404618836 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 22 |
Conventionalism about necessity was deemed hopeless for a long time. The philosophical landscape, however, is shifting now with recent work in modal metaphysics locating the source of necessity in some kind of convention, albeit non-linguistic. Modal neo-conventionalists claim that a proposition is necessary just when it is true and is classified as such as a matter of convention. But what is the function of adopting a convention about necessity? And what are these conventions that distinguish what is possible from what is impossible, anyway? In this paper, I first offer an elucidation of the two accounts of neo-conventionalism, which I call 'worlds-based neo-conventionalism' and 'axiom-based neo-conventionalism'. Then, I discuss a number of pressing questions that modal neo-conventionalism faces. The moral is that neo-conventionalists have some work to do in order for the account to be explanatorily satisfactory
Convention · Conventionalism · Economics · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Modal · Social science · Sociology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Language, truth and logic
Necessary Beings
The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics
The Routledge Handbook of Modality
Writing the Book of the World
The function of modal judgment and the Kantian gap
What’s Metaphysical About Metaphysical Necessity? 1
Fact, fiction, and forecast
Convention
The Grounds of Necessity
| Altamente citado | Não |
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