Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4079294
AutoresJan Sprenger (0000-0003-0083-9685, Tilburg University, autor correspondente)
Ano2011
Volume6
Fascículo7
Páginas497-508
Data de publicação2011-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00409.x
OpenAlexW2171434515
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas11
Referências citadas24

Hypothetico-deductive (H-D) confirmation builds on the idea that confirming evidence consists of successful predictions that deductively follow from the hypothesis under test. This article reviews scope, history and recent development of the venerable H-D account: First, we motivate the approach and clarify its relationship to Bayesian confirmation theory. Second, we explain and discuss the tacking paradoxes which exploit the fact that H-D confirmation gives no account of evidential relevance. Third, we review several recent proposals that aim at a sound and more comprehensive formulation of H-D confirmation. Finally, we conclude that the reputation of H-D confirmation as outdated and hopeless is undeserved: not only can the technical problems be addressed satisfactorily, the H-D method is also highly relevant for scientific practice

Epistemology · Political science · Reasonable Doubt · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology