Time and Personal Identity in Nietzsche's Theory of Eternal Recurrence

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4079520
AutoresScott Jenkins, Scott A Jenkins (University of Kansas, autor correspondente)
Ano2012
Volume7
Fascículo3
Páginas208-217
Data de publicação2012-03-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00473.x
OpenAlexW1540467676
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas21

Friedrich Nietzsche's theory of eternal recurrence is an essential part of his mature philosophy, but the theory's metaphysical commitments and practical implications are both obscure. In this essay I consider only the metaphysical elements of the theory, with the aim of determining whether it is possible that we live our lives infinitely many times, as the theory maintains. I argue that the possibility of eternal recurrence turns on issues in personal identity and the metaphysics of time. As I proceed, I also consider the relation between Nietzsche's theory of eternal recurrence and theories of recurrence found in the work of Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans, and the Stoics

Aesthetics · B-theory of time · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Personal identity · Self · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy