Margaret Cavendish on Perception, Self-Knowledge, and Probable Opinion

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4079693
AutoresDeborah Boyle (0000-0003-2975-2268, College of Charleston, autor correspondente)
Ano2015
Volume10
Fascículo7
Páginas438-450
Data de publicação2015-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12232
OpenAlexW1597326065
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas14
Referências citadas15

Scholarly interest in Margaret Cavendish's philosophical views has steadily increased over the past decade, but her epistemology has received little attention, and no consensus has emerged; Cavendish has been characterized as a skeptic, as a rationalist, as presenting an alternative epistemology to both rationalism and empiricism, and even as presenting no clear theory of knowledge at all. This paper concludes that Cavendish was only a modest skeptic, for she believed that humans can achieve knowledge through sensitive and rational perception as well as through self-knowledge and can form probable opinions through reasoning

Empiricism · Epistemology · Perception · Rationalism · Skepticism · Historical Philosophy and Science · History and Developments in Astronomy · Medical History and Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology