Normative Reasons for Love, Part II

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4079708
AutoresAaron Smuts (Rhode Island College, autor correspondente)
Ano2014
Volume9
Fascículo8
Páginas518-526
Data de publicação2014-08-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12160
OpenAlexW3190106768
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas11
Referências citadas29

Are there normative reasons for love? More specifically, is it possible to rationally justify love? Or can we at best provide explanations for why we love? In Part I of this entry, I discuss the nature of love, theories of emotion, and what it takes to justify an attitude. In Part II, I provide an overview of the various positions one might take on the rational justification of love. I focus on the debate between defenders of the no-reasons view and the reasons view. Along the way, I discuss the significance of falling in love, the problem of trading up, and the notion of irreplaceability. I evaluate attempts to justify love based on the intrinsic and the relational properties of the beloved

Epistemology · Normative · Law in Society and Culture · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification