Well-being, part 2
Theories of well-being
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 4079779 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Eden Lin (0000-0001-8210-8995) |
| Ano | 2022 |
| Volume | 17 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Data de publicação | 2022-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12813 |
| OpenAlex | W4205322664 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 3 |
| Referências citadas | 141 |
Theories of well-being purport to identify the features of lives, and of intervals within lives, in virtue of which some people are high in well-being and others are low in well-being. They also purport to identify the properties that make some events or states of affairs good for a person and other events or states of affairs bad for a person. This article surveys some of the main theories of well-being, with an emphasis on work published since the turn of the century
Epistemology · Political science · Sociology · Virtue · Well-being · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychological Well-being and Life Satisfaction · Psychology · Law · Philosophy · Social Psychology
The Pursuit of Unhappiness
Dead Wrong
The Philosophy of Well-Being
The Point of View of the Universe
Well-Being and Death
What Is Good and Why
What Is This Thing Called Happiness?
Human Flourishing Versus Desire Satisfaction
Metaphysical Dependence
Full Information Accounts of Well-Being
Facts and Values
Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good
Happiness and Meaning
Natural Law
The foreign policy decision-maker simulation
Welfare and the Achievement of Goals
Welfare Invariabilism
Values, Agency, and Welfare
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being
Why Subjectivists About Welfare Needn't Idealize
Beyond Neutrality
Desert
Enumeration and explanation in theories of welfare
Against Welfare Subjectivism
Human and Animal Well‐Being
Adaptive Preference
Well-Being and the Priority of Values
In Defense of Happiness
Attraction, Description and the Desire-Satisfaction Theory of Welfare
Quirky Desires and Well-Being
Working Hard and Kicking Back
Desire Satisfactionism and the Problem of Irrelevant Desires
The Welfare-Nihilist Arguments Against Judgment Subjectivism
Reasons and the Good
The Experience Machine and Mental State Theories of Well-being
Preferences and Prudential Reasons
Alienation, Deprivation, and the Well-being of Persons
Subjectivism without Idealization and Adaptive Preferences
On Two Interpretations of the Desire-Satisfaction Theory of Prudential Value
The badness of pain
"Brandt's Definition of "Good
Subjectivism without Desire
Moral Realism
Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure
Meaningfulness and Time
Must Adaptive Preferences Be Prudentially Bad for Us
Hedonism and the Experience Machine
Why Idealize
How to Use the Experience Machine
From Valuing to Value
Pluralism about Well‐Being
Sumner On Desires and Well-Being
Can Unstable Preferences Provide a Stable Standard of Well-Being
The subjective intuition
The sentience argument for experientialism about welfare
Desire-satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal
The experience requirement on well-being
Problems for Perfectionism
Subjectivism and Idealization
Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism
The problem of defective desires
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings
A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being
The Significance of a Life’s Shape
Life's Values
Prudence for Changing Selves
Adaptive Preferences Are a Red Herring
A New Defense of Hedonism about Well-Being
Pleasure and the Good Life
Preferentism and Self‐sacrifice
A Theory of Prudence
Achievement
Women and Human Development
Why should Welfare 'Fit
Perfectionist Bads
The Idea of Justice
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,5 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 3 |