Bayesianism I
Introduction and Arguments in Favor
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 4079873 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Kenny Easwaran (0000-0002-2278-6257, University of Southern California, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2011 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Fascículo | 5 |
| Páginas | 312-320 |
| Data de publicação | 2011-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00399.x |
| OpenAlex | W1517123228 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 23 |
| Referências citadas | 41 |
Bayesianism is a popular position (or perhaps, positions) in the philosophy of science, epistemology, statistics, and other related areas, which represents belief as coming in degrees, measured by a probability function. In this article, I give an overview of the unifying features of the different positions called 'Bayesianism', and discuss several of the arguments traditionally used to support them
Economics · Epistemology · Philosophy of science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Bias
Bias
Formal Epistemology Meets Mechanism Design
Don't trust Fodor's guide in Monte Carlo
An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization
Logic of Justified Beliefs Based on Argumentation
Rethinking the credal basis of rational judgment and suspension
Reflecting on diachronic Dutch books
Are knowledge ascriptions sensitive to social context
Belief, credence, and moral encroachment
Epistemic closure, assumptions and topics of inquiry
Normative theories of argumentation
Basing for the Bayesian
Partial truth versus felicitous falsehoods
Dutch Book against Lewis
Having a look at the Bayes Blind Spot
On the proper formulation of conditionalization
Reply to Sprenger’s “A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence”
Scientific Theories as Bayesian Nets
Racial realism II
Belief Revision I
Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem
Belief Revision II
Probability Theory
The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
Justifying Conditionalization
Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem
Belief and the Will
Updating Subjective Probability
Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque
Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
Prospect Theory
How Probabilities Reflect Evidence
Beauty and the Bets
Conditionalization and observation
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be
Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
A Note on Jeffrey Conditionalization
Is There a Dutch Book Argument for Probability Kinematics
Representation Theorems and Realism About Degrees of Belief
Probability Kinematics and Commutativity
The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs
Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs
Defeating Dr. Evil with Self‐Locating Belief
Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Arguments for–or against–Probabilism
Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability
| Obras citantes distintas | 23 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,77 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2013 - 2026 (14) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 22 |