Double Whammy

Lay Assessors as Lackeys in Chinese Courts

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4085508
AutoresXin He (0000-0002-9814-1666, autor correspondente)
Ano2016
Volume50
Fascículo3
Páginas733-765
Data de publicação2016-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoLaw & Society Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0023-9216 • E-ISSN: 1540-5893
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/lasr.12218
OpenAlexW2493377095
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas20

Primarily drawing on in-depth interviews with lay assessors and judges in Chinese courts, this study suggests that assessors are little more than lackeys. To determine the role of lay participation in decision making across different jurisdictions, this article proposes two variables. The first is whether lay assessors are separate from, or mixed with, professional judges; the second is whether the regime is democratic or authoritarian. Viewed according to these variables, China's lay-assessor institution is subject to a double whammy: one, the superior legal knowledge of professional judges and their dominance in procedures, and two, the ultimate control of the regime over judges, who, for self-protection, firmly control lay assessors. This article advances our understanding of the operation of the Chinese lay-assessor institution, and more generally the relationship between lay participation and political regimes

Authoritarianism · China · Control (management · Democracy · Dominance (genetics · Economics · Institution · Management · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Jury Decision Making Processes · Law · Law in Society and Culture