By Leibniz's Law

Remarks on a Fallacy

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4351141
AutoresBenjamin Schnieder (0000-0001-8565-2953, Universität Hamburg, autor correspondente)
Ano2006
Volume56
Fascículo222
Páginas39-54
Data de publicação2006-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00427.x
OpenAlexW2006705603
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas9
Referências citadas5

I investigate a form of argument which refers to Leibniz's law as its inference ticket (where ‘Leibniz's law’ is understood as the thesis that if x = y, then all properties of x are properties of y, and vice versa). Arguments of this form are often used to establish certain categorial distinctions, e.g., a distinction between kinds and properties, or a distinction between processes and events. I show that there can be deficient arguments of this form, and why. I then argue that the interesting philosophical cases of this argument form are unconvincing, since they cannot be seen as clear cases of its unproblematic variety

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Fallacy · Inference · Variety (cybernetics) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science