Pular para o conteúdo principal

ETHNOS_APP

Início • Busca • Periódicos • Lista 0

Humean Nature

How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4351237
AutoresErrol Lord (University of Pennsylvania)
Ano2019
Volume69
Fascículo274
Páginas202-206
Data de publicação2019-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqy033
OpenAlexW2883092575
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas3

Humean theories of moral psychology explain the phenomena just by appeal to beliefs and desires. Once Humean moral psychology was orthodoxy, but then a revolt against it flourished for several—productive—decades. Now a Humean counter-revolt is under way. Here Neil Sinhababu joins the counter-revolt. I recommend it for those interested in the central notions of moral psychology—desire, intention, moral judgment, and will power. Although it has its quirks, it provides many interesting arguments and is sure to stimulate future discussion. Sinhababu's Humean theory centres on two theses, the Desire-Belief Theory of Action and the Desire-Belief Theory of Reasoning: Desire-Belief Theory of Action: One is motivated to A if and only if desire that E is combined with belief that one can raise E’s probability by A-ing. Desire-Belief Theory of Reasoning: Desire that M is created as the conclusion of reasoning if and only if the reasoning combines desire that E with belief that M would raise E’s probability. It is eliminated as the conclusion of reasoning if and only if the reasoning eliminates such a combination

Action (physics · Epistemology · Feeling · Moral psychology · Moral reasoning · Practical reason · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Philosophy

  • Aesthetics of Food Porn

    Open Access•Uku Tooming•Critica•2021

  • Reasons

    Open Access•Errol Lord, Kurt Sylvan•Journal of Ethics and Social…•2019

  • Desire as Belief

    Alex Gregory•Desire As Belief•2021

Obras citantes distintas3
Citações por ano0,43
Intervalo de citações2019 - 2021 (3)
Velocidade de citaçãohistorical
Altamente citadoNão
Tipos de citaçãoNeutras: 3

Ferramentas

Abrir DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Projeto Open Source • Licença MIT • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacidade e Cookies • Documentação da API: api.ethnos.app/docs • Código da API: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Código do Frontend: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae