On Enforcing Unjust Laws in a Just Society
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 4351307 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jake Monaghan (0000-0003-3663-1675, University at Buffalo, New York, USA, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2018 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Fascículo | 273 |
| Páginas | 758-778 |
| Data de publicação | 2018-10-01 |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqy013 |
| OpenAlex | W2897719372 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 3 |
| Referências citadas | 12 |
Legitimate political institutions sometimes produce clearly unjust laws. It is widely recognized, especially in the context of war, that agents of the state may not enforce political decisions that are very seriously unjust or are the decisions of illegitimate governments. But may agents of legitimate states enforce unjust, but not massively unjust, laws? In this paper, I respond to three defences of the view that it is permissible to enforce these unjust laws. Analogues of the Walzerian argument from patriotism, the Vitorian epistemic argument, and the proceduralist argument found in Rawls, Estlund, and others do not show that law enforcement is usually permitted to enforce unjust laws. Finally, I develop a proceduralist argument for the thesis that law enforcement is permitted to disregard unjust laws. I conclude by considering objections concerning the problem of optimizing society for justice and the problem of law enforcement agents with deplorable moral beliefs.
Argument (complex analysis) · Context (archaeology) · Economic Justice · Enforcement · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Sociology · State (computer science) · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Torture, Ethics, and Law · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Citações por ano | 1 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citações | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Altamente citado | Não |