Separating action and knowledge

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4351373
AutoresM Kelley (0000-0001-5131-0525, University of Chicago, autor correspondente)
Ano2025
Volume75
Fascículo3
Páginas956-977
Data de publicação2025-06-12
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqae050
OpenAlexW4399055117
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas4
Referências citadas49

Intentional action is often accompanied by knowledge of what one is doing-knowledge that appears non-observational and non-inferential. G.E.M. Anscombe defends the stronger claim that intentional action always comes with such knowledge. Among those who follow Anscombe, some have altered the features, content, or species of the knowledge claimed to necessarily accompany intentional action. In this paper, I argue that there is no knowledge condition on intentional action, no matter the assumed features, content, or species of the knowledge. Further, rather than follow the usual methodology in this debate of arguing by counterexample, I present an argument that explains why we continue to find counterexamples: intentional action and knowledge are regulated by thresholds under distinct pressures; in particular, the threshold of control regulating intentional action is disparately influenced by the role of intentional action in practical normativity

Action (physics) · Physics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics