Pular para o conteúdo principal

ETHNOS_APP

Início • Busca • Periódicos • Lista 0

A Hyperintensional Account of Metaphysical Equivalence

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4351689
AutoresKristie Miller (0000-0002-5092-8419, The University of Sydney, autor correspondente)
Ano2017
Volume67
Fascículo269
Páginas772-793
Data de publicação2017-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqx015
OpenAlexW2603152858
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas3
Referências citadas19

This paper argues for a particular view about in what metaphysical equivalence consists: namely, that any two metaphysical theories are metaphysically equivalent if and only if those theories are strongly hyperintensionally equivalent. It is consistent with this characterisation that said theories are weakly hyperintensionally distinct; thus, affording us the resources to model the content of propositional attitudes directed towards metaphysically equivalent theories in such a way that non-ideal agents can bear different propositional attitudes towards metaphysically equivalent theories.

Epistemology · Equivalence (formal languages) · Linguistics · Logical equivalence · Metaphysics · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

  • Hyperintensionality and Ontological Categories

    Open Access•J T M Miller•Erkenntnis•2024

  • First among equals

    Open Access•Brooke Jespersen•Synthese•2021

  • The cost of closure

    Open Access•Michaela M Mcsweeney•Synthese•2021

  • Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content

    Scott Soames•Philosophical Topics•1987

  • Structures and circumstances

    Open Access•David Ripley•Synthese•2012

  • The Logic of Significance and Context

    Kit Fine, Linda Goddard et al.•The Philosophical Quarterly•1978

  • Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense

    Open Access•Eli Hirsch•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2005

  • Propositional attitudes

    Open Access•Mark Richard•Journal of Pragmatics•1993

  • Impossible Worlds

    Open Access•Daniel P Nolan, Daniel Nolan•Philosophy Compass•2013

Obras citantes distintas3
Citações por ano0,6
Intervalo de citações2021 - 2024 (4)
Velocidade de citaçãorecent
Altamente citadoNão
Tipos de citaçãoNeutras: 3
Ethnos_APP • Projeto Open Source • Licença MIT • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacidade e Cookies • Documentação da API: api.ethnos.app/docs • Código da API: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Código do Frontend: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae