An Argument for Power Inheritance

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4351990
AutoresUmut Baysan (University of Glasgow, autor correspondente)
Ano2016
Volume66
Fascículo263
Páginas383-390
Data de publicação2016-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqv126
OpenAlexW2176335797
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas4
Referências citadas23

Non-reductive physicalism is commonly understood as the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties. Here, I argue that the realization relation in question is a power inheritance relation: if a property P realizes a property Q, then the causal powers of Q are a subset of the causal powers of P. Whereas others have motivated this claim by appealing to its theoretical benefits, I argue that it is in fact entailed by two theses: (1) realization is a same-subject necessitation relation; (2) properties have their causal powers derivatively on the causal powers of their bearers. Although the power inheritance claim that is defended here has many opponents, I take it that the two theses that entail it are either plausible or widely assumed.

Argument (complex analysis) · Biology · Epistemology · Inheritance (genetic algorithm) · Physics · Power (physics) · Genetics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics