On a Sufficient Condition for Hyperintensionality

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4352133
AutoresVera Hoffmann-Kol, Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (0000-0001-5324-0559, University of Cologne, autor correspondente)
Ano2015
Volume65
Fascículo260
Páginas336-354
Data de publicação2015-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqv021
OpenAlexW2326288061
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas33

Let an X/Y distinction be a distinction between kinds of properties, such as the distinctions between qualitative and non-qualitative, intrinsic and extrinsic, perfectly natural and less-than-perfectly natural or dispositional and categorical properties. An X/Y distinction is hyperintensional iff there are cointensional properties P and Q, such that P is an X-property, whereas Q is a Y-property. Many accounts of metaphysical distinctions among properties presuppose that such distinctions are non-hyperintensional. In this paper, I call this presupposition into question. I develop a sufficient condition for the hyperintensionality of X/Y distinctions and argue that this condition is satisfied by a number of standard classifications of properties. It follows that non-hyperintensional analyses of distinctions among properties are harder to defend than is often assumed.

Aesthetics · Categorical variable · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Natural (archaeology) · Natural kind · Presupposition · Property (philosophy) · Pure mathematics · Statistics · Classical Philosophy and Thought · History · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science