How to Win in Iraq

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4452396
AutoresAndrew F Krepinevich (autor correspondente)
Ano2005
Volume84
Fascículo5
Páginas87
Data de publicação2005-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoForeign Affairs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0015-7120 • E-ISSN: 2327-7793
EditoraJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/20031708
OpenAlexW2580448046
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas22

DESPITE THE Bush administration's repeated declarations of its commitment to success in Iraq, the results of current policy there are not encouraging. After two years, Washington has made little progress in defeating the insurgency or providing security for Iraqis, even as it has overextended the U.S. Army and eroded support for the war among the American public. Although withdrawing now would be a mistake, simply staying the course, by all current indications, will not improve matters either. Winning in Iraq will require a new approach. The basic problem is that the United States and its coalition part ners have never settled on a strategy for defeating the insurgency and achieving their broader objectives. On the political front, they have been working to create a democratic Iraq, but that is a goal, not a strat egy. On the military front, they have sought to train Iraqi security forces and turn the war over to them. As President George W. Bush has stated, Our strategy can be summed up this way: as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down. But the president is describing a withdrawal plan rather than a strategy. Without a clear strategy in Iraq, moreover, there is no good way to gauge progress. Senior political and military leaders have thus repeatedly made overly optimistic or even contradictory declarations. In May of 2004, for example, following the insurgent takeover of

Development economics · Economics · Iraq war · Political economy · Political science · Anthropology: Ethics, History, Culture · Law