Consciousness and mind in Peirce

Distinctions and Complementarities

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4474534
AutoresLúcia Santaella (0000-0002-0681-6073, Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo , São Paulo , Brazil, autor correspondente)
Ano2021
Volume2021
Fascículo243
Páginas105-128
Data de publicação2021-11-25
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoSemiotica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0037-1998 • E-ISSN: 1613-3692
EditoraWalter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1515/sem-2021-0118
OpenAlexW3205175144
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas29

In a brief overview this article discusses that, in the multifaceted field of cognitive sciences, the problem of consciousness and mind is far from being resolved. The article then argues that this problem is worked out in careful detail in Peirce's work. Intelligence, hence mind, for Peirce, is distinct from consciousness. Without being dissociable, they are, in fact, distinct but complementary. Hence, Peirce's ideas should be recovered not only for the sake of their relevance, but also because cognitivists have a lot to learn from Peirce

Cognition · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Epistemology · Field (mathematics) · Political science · Relevance (law) · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Psychology