Agent, person, subject, self

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4474563
AutoresPaul Kockelman (autor correspondente)
Ano2006
Volume2006
Fascículo162
Páginas1-18
Data de publicação2006-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoSemiotica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0037-1998 • E-ISSN: 1613-3692
EditoraWalter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1515/sem.2006.072
OpenAlexW2900236823
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas16
Referências citadas1

Building on ideas developed in ‘The semiotic stance’ (2005), this essay outlines a social and semiotic theory of four seemingly human-specific and individual-centric capacities that, while essential for understanding modern social processes, are often confused and conflated. Loosely speaking, agency is a causal capacity: say, the relatively flexible wielding of means towards ends. Subjectivity is a representational capacity: say, the holding of intentional states such as belief and desire. Selfhood is a reflexive capacity: say, being the means and ends of one's own actions, or being the object of one's own beliefs and desires. And personhood is a sociopolitical capacity: say, rights and responsibilities attendant on being an agent, subject or self

Aesthetics · Agency (philosophy) · Conflation · Epistemology · Identity (music) · Linguistics · Object (grammar) · Personhood · Reflexivity · Self · Semiotics · Social science · Sociology · Subject (documents) · Subjectivity · Computer Science · Language, Discourse, Communication Strategies · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education