The Problem of Uniqueness in History

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4496037
AutoresCarey B Joynt, Nicholas Rescher
Ano1961
Volume1
Fascículo2
Páginas150
Data de publicação1961-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoHistory and Theory (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0018-2656 • E-ISSN: 1468-2303
EditoraJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2504378
OpenAlexW2025457026
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas15

The claim is frequently made that mode of explanation to be found in history differs radically and fundamentally from types of explanation found in natural or social sciences. This difference is said to lie in fact that history, unlike science, must always deal with the description of a situation or state of affairs which is unique.' It is argued that exclusive objects of historical understanding are unique, particular, concrete events: historian, it is contended, is primarily concerned with describing and analyzing unique features of his data, unlike scientist who looks to generic. It is thesis of this paper that such a claim for history (which, when properly understood, contains a large measure of truth) cannot, without severe qualifications, survive objections which can be brought against it. Practicing historians, it is true, sometimes try to defend claim of history to uniqueness, but as a rule these efforts are swept aside by critics as special pleading that does not come to grips with substantive arguments which can be marshalled against them. In interests of clarity and truth it should be frankly recognized, to begin with, that, in a significant sense, every particular event whatsoever is unique

Epistemology · Mathematical analysis · Mathematical economics · Uniqueness · History · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy, History, and Historiography