Historical Explanation

The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4496689
AutoresAlan Donagan (autor correspondente)
Ano1964
Volume4
Fascículo1
Páginas3
Data de publicação1964-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoHistory and Theory (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0018-2656 • E-ISSN: 1468-2303
EditoraJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2504200
OpenAlexW2317061317
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas8
Referências citadas6

For better or worse, the point of departure for most recent philosophical investigations of historical explanation is a theory which has been lucidly and succinctly propounded by Professors K. R. Popper and C. G. Hempel.' Their theory has been vehemently assailed and defended; and Hempel himself has been prevailed upon to modify it. These controversies, especially since the appearance of Professor W. H. Dray's Laws and Explanations in History, have generated light as well as heat. We can now see what the theory is clearly enough to appraise it. ? 1. Popper's Statement of the Theory Popper's theory of historical explanation is a special application of his general theory of causal explanation, which he formulated as follows: To give a causal explanation of an event means to deduce a statement which describes it, using as premises of the deduction one or more universal laws, together with certain singular statements, the initial conditions (Popper [20], 59). Although it has sometimes been thought that Popper intended to offer a theory of explanation in general, his own statement shows that he did not. He mentioned no explanations except those which are both causal, and of events. He did not pretend to analyze such things as explanations of the symbolism of the Imperial regalia at a coronation, or of how a fielder could

Epistemology · Karl popper · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science