The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4825543
AutoresJ J Cunningham (0000-0003-2832-3824, Jesus College, University of Oxford, autor correspondente)
Ano2019
Volume69
Fascículo275
Páginas235-257
Data de publicação2019-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqy019
OpenAlexW2905050363
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas5
Referências citadas29

We can contrast rationalising explanations of the form S φs because p with those of the form S φs because S believes that p. According the Common Kind View, the two sorts of explanation are the same. The Disjunctive View denies this. This paper sets out to elucidate the sense in which the Common Kind Theorist asserts, but the Disjunctivist denies, that the two explanations are the same. I suggest that, in the light of the distinction between kinds of explanation and particular explanations, the relevant sameness thesis is ambiguous, thus giving us two distinct versions of the Common Kind View. I then argue that the only direct arguments for Disjunctivism available in the literature fail because they only succeed in undermining one version of the Common Kind View. I finish, however, by providing a fresh argument for the Disjunctive View which aims to undermine both versions of its competitor

Argument (complex analysis · Common sense · Contrast (vision · Epistemology · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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