Non-Traditional Factors in Judgments about Knowledge

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4856735
AutoresWesley Buckwalter (0000-0002-6222-5083, The Graduate Center, CUNY, autor correspondente)
Ano2012
Volume7
Fascículo4
Páginas278-289
Data de publicação2012-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00466.x
OpenAlexW1605817097
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas7
Referências citadas47

One recent trend in contemporary epistemology is to study the way in which the concept of knowledge is actually applied in everyday settings. This approach has inspired an exciting new spirit of collaboration between experimental philosophers and traditional epistemologists, who have begun using the techniques of the social sciences to investigate the factors that influence ordinary judgments about knowledge attribution. This paper provides an overview of some of the results these researchers have uncovered, suggesting that in addition to traditionally considered factors like evidence and justification, a number of important non-truth-conducive factors play significant roles in determining when people ascribe knowledge. The present review focuses on four non-traditional factors: pragmatic load (in relation to contextualism and interest-relative invariantism), moral judgment, performance errors, and demographic variation

Attribution · Contextualism · Epistemology · Linguistics · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology