A Pragmatist Defense of Non-relativistic Explanatory Pluralism in History and Social Science

Dados Bibliográficos

ID4864010
AutoresJeroen Van Bouwel (0000-0002-7335-0816, Ghent University Hospital), Eugen Weber (0000-0002-0339-3810, Ghent University Hospital), Erik Weber (0009-0000-1508-2422)
Ano2008
Volume47
Fascículo2
Páginas168-182
Data de publicação2008-05-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoHistory and Theory (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0018-2656 • E-ISSN: 1468-2303
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-2303.2008.00445.x
OpenAlexW2080903960
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas9
Referências citadas2

Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Førland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We defend the last position. Finally, our third aim is to argue that pluralism should not be equated with "anything goes": we will argue for non-relativistic explanatory pluralism. This pluralism will be illustrated by examples from history and social science in which different forms of explanation (for example, structural, functional, and intentional explanations) are discussed, and the fruitfulness of our framework for understanding explanatory pluralism is shown

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Explanatory model · Pluralism (philosophy) · Pragmatism · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science