The Doomsday Argument and the Number of Possible Observers

If the human race comes to an end relatively shortly, then we have been born at a fairly typical time in history of humanity. On the other hand, if humanity lasts for much longer and trillions of people eventually exist, then we have been born in the first surprisingly tiny fraction of all people. According to the Doomsday Argument of Carter, Leslie, Gott, and Nielsen, this means that the chance of a disaster which would obliterate humanity is much larger than usually thought. Here I argue for the principle, originally discussed by Dieks, that the case of a long-lived race provides a much greater chance to exist at all, and this cancels the Doomsday Argument, so that the chance of a disaster is only what one would ordinarily estimate. 1

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Medicine · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Space exploration and regulation · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life

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