Bank Supervision, Regulation, and Instability During the Great Depression
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 4875813 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Kris James Mitchener (Santa Clara University, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2005 |
| Volume | 65 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 152-185 |
| Data de publicação | 2005-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Journal of Economic History (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-0507 • E-ISSN: 1471-6372 |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0022050705050060 |
| OpenAlex | W2890229774 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 12 |
| Referências citadas | 40 |
Even after controlling for local economic conditions, differences in supervision and regulation help explain the large variation in state bank suspension rates across U.S. counties during the Great Depression. More stringent capital requirements lowered suspension rates whereas laws prohibiting branch banking and imposing high reserve requirements raised them. States whose bank supervisors could liquidate banks minimized contagion and credit-channel dislocations and experienced lower suspension rates. Those that gave their supervisors sole authority to issue bank charters and granted their supervisors long terms strengthened the incentives for bank lobbyists to influence supervisory decisions and consequently experienced higher rates of suspension
Bank regulation · Business · Capital (architecture) · Capital requirement · Depression (economics) · Economics · Financial crisis · Financial system · Geography · Great Depression · Incentive · Macroeconomics · Macroprudential regulation · Market economy · Monetary economics · Political science · State (computer science) · Suspension (topology) · Systemic risk · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Law
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The Formalization of Banking Supervision in Japan and Sweden
Does “skin in the game” reduce risk taking? Leverage, liability and the long-run consequences of new deal banking reforms
Durable consumption, bank distress, economic concerns, and how they interacted during the great depression
The Logic and Legitimacy of Bank Supervision
Collateral Damage
The Evolution of Bank Supervisory Institutions
What Caused Chicago Bank Failures in the Great Depression? A Look at the 1920s
Monetary Intervention Really Did Mitigate Banking Panics During the Great Depression
Competition, over-branching and bank failures during the Great Depression
The Politics of Government Decision-Making
The Regulation of Entry
The Theory of Economic Regulation
The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality
A Reconsideration of the Causes of the Banking Panic of 1930
The Shoe That Didn't Drop
Bank Capital and Bank Failure, 1921–1932
A Reinterpretation of the Banking Crisis of 1930
Regulation and Bank Failures
| Obras citantes distintas | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,57 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2005 - 2025 (21) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 12 |