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Knowing the Rational Peasant

The Creation of Rival Incentive Structures in Vietnam

Dados Bibliográficos

ID5031888
AutoresRobert Maranto (0000-0001-6796-3627, James Madison University), Paula S Tuchman (University of Minnesota)
Ano1992
Volume29
Fascículo3
Páginas249-264
Data de publicação1992-08-01
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Peace Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022343392029003002
OpenAlexW1975644924
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas8
Referências citadas24

This paper develops a rational model of individual participation in anti-regime activity based on the works of Tullock (1971), Mason (1986) and others, and applies it to the Vietnamese conflicts of the 1945-75 period. Concerns for physical security and expectations of victory by one side or another dominated the peasant `decision calculus' to the relative exclusion of such factors as ideology and provision of public goods. The critical factor in creating an attractive incentive structure is sound intelligence obtained through local forms of organization and coercion. Until the mid-1960s, the Viet Cong excelled in this regard, but subsequent governmental attention to local organization and deployment of forces narrowed the gap considerably, as did the Tet Offensive decimation of native Viet Cong forces in the South. Also contributing to this outcome were increased Viet Cong demands on the peasantry that made material rewards from supporting the anti-regime effort less appealing. The village emerges as the key unit in overcoming the free-rider problem in revolutionary participation. The apparent success within the village itself of the opposition or regime and behavior of local cadres or officials shaped villagers' perceptions of the credibility and capability of each side to threaten physical security. Villagers' judgment on the balance of terror at any time in turn conditioned their response to the various other incentives offered

Economics · Incentive · Management · Market economy · Offensive · Opposition (politics) · Peasant · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Victory · Chinese history and philosophy · Law · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies

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Citações por ano0,25
Intervalo de citações1994 - 2024 (31)
Altamente citadoNão

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