Knowing the Rational Peasant
The Creation of Rival Incentive Structures in Vietnam
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 5031888 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Robert Maranto (0000-0001-6796-3627, James Madison University), Paula S Tuchman (University of Minnesota) |
| Ano | 1992 |
| Volume | 29 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 249-264 |
| Data de publicação | 1992-08-01 |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Editora | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343392029003002 |
| OpenAlex | W1975644924 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 8 |
| Referências citadas | 24 |
This paper develops a rational model of individual participation in anti-regime activity based on the works of Tullock (1971), Mason (1986) and others, and applies it to the Vietnamese conflicts of the 1945-75 period. Concerns for physical security and expectations of victory by one side or another dominated the peasant `decision calculus' to the relative exclusion of such factors as ideology and provision of public goods. The critical factor in creating an attractive incentive structure is sound intelligence obtained through local forms of organization and coercion. Until the mid-1960s, the Viet Cong excelled in this regard, but subsequent governmental attention to local organization and deployment of forces narrowed the gap considerably, as did the Tet Offensive decimation of native Viet Cong forces in the South. Also contributing to this outcome were increased Viet Cong demands on the peasantry that made material rewards from supporting the anti-regime effort less appealing. The village emerges as the key unit in overcoming the free-rider problem in revolutionary participation. The apparent success within the village itself of the opposition or regime and behavior of local cadres or officials shaped villagers' perceptions of the credibility and capability of each side to threaten physical security. Villagers' judgment on the balance of terror at any time in turn conditioned their response to the various other incentives offered
Economics · Incentive · Management · Market economy · Offensive · Opposition (politics) · Peasant · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Victory · Chinese history and philosophy · Law · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies
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The rational peasant
| Citações por ano | 0,25 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citações | 1994 - 2024 (31) |
| Altamente citado | Não |