Perception

I Shall offer a realist theory of perception which in an important sense is neither direct nor representational nor causal.Let us say that we directly perceive something if perceiving it enables us to know of its existence without having evidence of its existence. In this sense, direct perception allows us to have "direct knowledge" of what we perceive. For example, I see after-images directly, since I can know of their existence without having visual evidence of their existence. I do not have to look at them with my eyes. Granted, I do need evidence in order to know that they are after-images; but not in order to know of their existence as colours or shapes. Also, I do have to see them in order to know that they exist. But this is not a condition of having evidence. It is only a condition of their existence, which in turn is a truth condition of my knowing

Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Order (exchange) · Perception · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

• More qualia trouble for functionalism

  Open Access•Edmond Wright•Synthese•1993

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• Perceiving

  Roderick M Chisholm•Perceiving•1957

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• Problems from Locke

  J L Mackie•Problems from Locke•1976

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• Analytical Philosophy

  Open Access•P F Strawson•Philosophical Books•1963

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• Analytical Philosophy

  Sydney Shoemaker, Ronald J Butler•The Philosophical Review•1965

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