Having an Idea of Matter

This paper explores Berkeley's denial of matter in the light of criticisms voiced by Charles S. Peirce, who wrote two extensive review essays, one in 1871 and one in 1901, on the Fraser editions of Berkeley's Works. Elaborating upon Peirce's criticisms and utilizing Peirce's semiotics and pragmatism (two doctrines for which Peirce gives partial credit to Berkeley), it is shown that Berkeley's argument against matter is inconclusive, that the hypothesis of matter can be made to fit within Berkeley's thought, and that doing so need not undermine the latter's esse is percipi doctrine

Argument (complex analysis) · Denial · Doctrine · Epistemology · Political science · Pragmatism · Psychoanalysis · Semiotics · Subject matter · Theology · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Psychology

• The history of philosophy conceived as a struggle between nominalism and realism

  Open Access•Cornelis De Waal•Semiotica•2010

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• The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne

  Willis Doney, A A Luce et al.•The Philosophical Review•1950

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• Berkeley

  Willis Doney, A C Grayling•The Philosophical Review•1989

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• Meaning and Action

  Open Access•James Ward Smith•Political Science Quarterly•1971

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