Mine or ours? Unintended framing effects in dictator games

Dados Bibliográficos

ID5722360
AutoresAndreas Bergh (0000-0003-2621-6769, Department of Economics, Lund university, Sweden; The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm, Sweden, autor correspondente), Philipp C Wichardt (0000-0002-7787-6831, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Germany; Department of Economics, Lund university, Sweden; Department of Economics, University of Rostock, Germany; CESifo Munich, Germany)
Ano2022
Volume34
Fascículo1
Páginas78-95
Data de publicação2022-02-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoRationality and Society (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/10434631211073326
OpenAlexW4206044391
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas33

This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small and typically unreported differences in standard instructions induce different perceptions regarding entitlement and ownership of the money to be distributed, and that these perceptions influence behaviour. Less is given when the task is described as a task of generosity and more when the task is a task of distribution (average 35 % vs. 52 %). The results can contribute to explaining the large variation in dictator game giving reported in the literature and show that even small and unreported differences in instructions change how the game is perceived. JEL codes: C70; C91; D63

Dictator · Dictator game · Economics · Generosity · Microeconomics · Perception · Political science · Stochastic game · Ultimatum game · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Ethics in Business and Education · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology