Institutional Inertia
Persistent Inefficient Institutions in Spain
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 5753376 |
|---|---|
| Autores | José‐antonio Espín‐sánchez (0000-0002-4387-8636, Yale University, autor correspondente), José-Antonio Espín-Sánchez |
| Ano | 2017 |
| Volume | 77 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 692-723 |
| Data de publicação | 2017-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Journal of Economic History (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-0507 • E-ISSN: 1471-6372 |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0022050717000705 |
| OpenAlex | W2251604995 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 4 |
| Referências citadas | 29 |
In 1966, after more than 700 years, the irrigation community in Mula (Spain) switched from auctions to quotas to allocate water from its river. This change happened in the absence of either political or technological change. Quotas were more efficient, but required that farmers own water property rights. I develop a model in which poor farmers cannot credibly commit to purchase water rights. I show that empirical evidence on savings and prices is consistent with this interpretation. A temporary increase in output prices in the 1950s and better financial institutions allowed farmers to accumulate savings and solve the commitment problem."There is nothing more difficult to arrange, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through, than to initiate a new order of things."Niccolò Machiavelli,The Prince
Business · Commit · Common value auction · Economics · Interpretation (philosophy) · Microeconomics · Order (exchange) · Political science · Politics · Property rights · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Finance · Historical Economic and Social Studies · Law · Water resources management and optimization
Understanding Institutional Diversity
Empirical Studies in Institutional Change
Governing the Commons
Order without Law
Growth in a Traditional Society
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Persecution Perpetuated
Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Governing the Commons
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Irrigation and Society in Medieval Valencia
Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy
Understanding Institutional Diversity
Governing scarcity. Water markets, equity and efficiency in pre-1950s eastern Spain
The Development of Irrigation in Provence, 1700-1860
Horn of Plenty”
Economic Variables and the Development of the Law
Imachi Nkwu
Trade, Institutions, and Ethnic Tolerance
Irrigation and Society in Medieval Valencia
And the Desert Shall Rejoice
The price of improvements
| Obras citantes distintas | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,8 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 3 |