The Ontology of Musical Works and the Role of Intuitions

An Experimental Study

Dados Bibliográficos

ID5772286
AutoresChristopher Bartel (0000-0002-4983-1214, Department of Philosophy and Religion Appalachian State University USA, autor correspondente)
Ano2017
Volume26
Fascículo1
Páginas348-367
Data de publicação2017-04-24
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoEuropean Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ejop.12247
OpenAlexW2610051242
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas7
Referências citadas23

Philosophers of music often appeal to intuition to defend ontological theories of musical works. This practice is worrisome as it is rather unclear just how widely shared are the intuitions that philosophers appeal to. In this paper, I will first offer a brief overview of the debate over the ontology of musical works. I will argue that this debate is driven by a conflict between two seemingly plausible intuitions-the repeatability intuition and the creatability intuition-both of which may be defended on the grounds that they are reflective of our actual musical practices. The problem facing philosophers within this debate is that there is no clear way to determine which of the two conflicting intuitions is more reflective of our musical practices. Finally, I offer discussion of an experimental study that was designed to test participants' intuitions regarding the repeatability of musical works. The evidence presented there suggests that the participants broadly accept the repeatability of musical works, but in a much narrower way than philosophers would likely accept

Experimental philosophy · Intuition · Musicology and Musical Analysis · Neuroscience and Music Perception · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment