The Most Agreeable of All Vices

Nietzsche as Virtue Epistemologist

Dados Bibliográficos

ID5843734
AutoresMark Alfano (0000-0001-5879-8033, Princeton University, autor correspondente)
Ano2012
Volume21
Fascículo4
Páginas767-790
Data de publicação2012-12-13
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526
EditoraTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09608788.2012.733308
OpenAlexW2090505115
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas17
Referências citadas34

It has been argued with some justice by commentators from Walter Kaufmann to Thomas Hurka that Nietzsche's positive ethical position is best understood as a variety of virtue theory - in particular, as a brand of perfectionism. For Nietzsche, value flows from character. Less attention has been paid, however, to the details of the virtues he identifies for himself and his type. This neglect, along with Nietzsche's frequent irony and non-standard usage, has obscured the fact that almost all the virtues he praises are intellectual rather than moral. The vices he most despises include dogmatism, intellectual partisanship, faith, boredom, the desire for certainty and pity. The virtues he most appreciates include curiosity, honesty, scepticism, creativity, the historical sense, intellectual courage and intellectual fastidiousness. These tables of values place Nietzsche squarely among so-called responsibilist virtue epistemologists, such as Lorraine Code and Linda Zagzebski, who emphasize that knowledge is infused with desire and affect. I argue that curiosity construed as the specification of the will to power in the domain of epistemology is the cardinal Nietzschean virtue, and that the others - especially intellectual courage and honesty - are presupposed by curiosity. Thus, Nietzsche turns out to accept his own peculiar brand of the thesis of the unity of virtue. Keywords: Nietzschevirtue epistemologyresponsibilismcuriosityintellectual couragehonesty Notes 1In this article, I cite the following translations of Nietzsche's works: Hollingdale's translation of Daybreak (D) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Kaufmann and Hollingdale's translation of On the Genealogy of Morals (GM) and Ecce Homo (EH) in 'On the Genealogy of Morals' and 'Ecce Homo' (New York: Vintage Paperbacks, 1989); Kaufmann's translations of The Gay Science (GS) (New York: Vintage, 1974), Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) (New York: Vintage, 1966); Hollingdale's translation of Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits (HH) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Adrian Del Caro's translation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Z) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Judith Norman's translation of The Anti-Christ (A) in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo and Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings (TI) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 2See, for instance, P. Foot, 'Nietzsche: The revaluation of all values', in Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by R. C. Solomon (Notre Dame, 1973) 81-95 and A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, 1981). 3See, among others, F. Cameron, Nietzsche and the "Problem" of Morality (New York, 2002); J. Conant, 'Nietzsche's perfectionism: A reading of Schopenhauer as Educator', in Nietzsche's Post-Moralism, edited by R. Schacht (Cambridge, 2001) 181-257; C. Daigle, 'Nietzsche: Virtue ethics... virtue politics?', The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 32 (Citation2006) 1-21; L. Hunt, Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue (London, 1991); T. Hurka, 'Nietzsche: Perfectionist', in Nietzsche and Morality, edited by B. Leiter and N. Sinhababu (Oxford, 2007) 9-31; N. Hussain, 'The role of life in the Genealogy', in Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide, edited by S. May (Cambridge, 2011) 142-69; P. Katsafanas, 'The relevance of history for moral philosophy: A study in Nietzsche's Genealogy', in Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide, edited by S. May (Cambridge, 2011) 170-92; S. May, Nietzsche Ethics and His War on Morality (Oxford, 1999); B. Reginster, The Affirmation of Life (Cambridge, 2006) and 'The will to power and the ethics of creativity', in Nietzsche and Morality, edited by B. Leiter and N. Sinhababu (Oxford, 2007) 32-56; J. Richardson, Nietzsche's New Darwinism (Oxford, 2004); M. Slote, 'Nietzsche and virtue ethics', International Studies in Philosophy, 30 (Citation1998) No. 3: 23-7; C. Swanton, 'Outline of a Nietzschean virtue ethics', International Studies in Philosophy, 30 (Citation1998) No. 3: 29-38 and Virtue Ethics: A Pluralist View (Oxford, 2003); and A. White, 'The youngest virtue', in Nietzsche's Post-Moralism, edited by R. Schacht (Cambridge, 2001) 63-78. 4The minimum standard belief would be some belief that functions as a doxastic 'yardstick', a good enough belief. 5For a related treatment of Nietzsche's drive theory, see P. Katsafanas, 'Nietzsche's philosophical psychology', in Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, edited by J. Richardson and K. Gemes (Oxford, forthcoming). 6I do not have the space to argue in this paper that creativity is a cardinal Nietzschean virtue, but I take it that this claim is much less controversial than the thesis I am advancing about curiosity, and that it has been defended convincingly already by Reginster, The Affirmation of Life and 'The will to power and the ethics of creativity'. 7I would like to thank Bernard Reginster for bringing to my attention Nietzsche's consistent self-attribution of curiosity, which he described brilliantly at the 2011 Pacific APA session of the North American Nietzsche Society. A version of that paper is now forthcoming in the Journal for the History of Philosophy. 8See Augustine, Confessions, translated by F. J. Sheed (Indianapolis, 1993) book 10, chapter 35 and T. Aquinas, The Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas Aquinas (London, 1952) II.2, question 35, article 4, objection 3. 9A borderline exception is Illhan Inan's The Philosophy of Curiosity (New York, 2011) monograph, which addresses curiosity from the perspective of philosophy of mind and language rather than virtue epistemology. 10These numbers were obtained by searching the database at http://www.nietzschesource.org. 11 HH 629, D 314, D 432, GS 375, GS 382, BGE 44, BGE 45, BGE 188, BGE 214, BGE 224, BGE 227, HH 1st Preface 3, HH 1st Preface 4, HH 2nd Preface 1, HH 2nd Preface 5, GS 2nd Preface 2, GM Preface 2, GM III.9, EH 'Clever' 1, EH 'Clever' 6, EH 'Books' Z 2. 12B. Reginster, 'Honesty and curiosity in Nietzsche's free spirit', Journal for the History of Philosophy (forthcoming) makes a similar point, though he commits only to the claim that curiosity is a disposition, not a virtue. 13This diagnosis of faith is even something philosophers of religion agree with. In her paper, Lara Buchak, 'Can it be rational to have faith?', in Probability in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by J. Chandler and V. S. Harrison (Oxford, forthcoming) Chapter 12 says (with a good conscience!) that faith requires 'terminating the search for further evidence' and 'not engaging in an inquiry'. 14For more on this, see B. Reginster, 'What is a free spirit? Nietzsche's critique of fanaticism', Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, 85 (Citation2003) No. 1: 51-85 and Reginster, 'Honesty and curiosity in Nietzsche's free spirit'. 15For contemporary discussions of the same attitude towards the curiosity of the dilletante, see L. Code, Epistemic Responsibility (Hanover, NH, 1987) 59 and L. Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge, 1996) 152. 16Thanks to Reginster for emphasizing this point to me. 17It is interesting to note how Nietzsche often appreciates things for being interesting (GS 1; GM I:1, I:6; A 14, 44) and depreciates them for being boring (GS 123, 232; BGE 227, 228, 239). 18Thanks to an anonymous referee for emphasizing this point to me. 19Reginster, 'Honesty and curiosity in Nietzsche's free spirit' makes a similar point. 20It is interesting to note that contemporary researchers in moral psychology are often just as nauseated as Nietzsche was. Edouard Machery, 'The bleak implications of moral psychology', Neuroethics, 3 (Citation2010) No. 3: 223-31, for example, speaks of the 'bleak implications' of moral psychology. 21In this context, HH 363 appears in a new light: 'If there were no curiosity little would be done to further the wellbeing of one's neighbor. But curiosity creeps into the house of the unfortunate and needy under the name of duty or pity'. 22For more on this, see Reginster, 'Honesty and curiosity in Nietzsche's free spirit'. 23Honesty does seem to require a modicum of courage, however, which indicates that honesty is more cardinal than courage, though less cardinal than curiosity. 24Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this alternative interpretation. 25Thanks to an anonymous referee for stressing this question to me. 26In light of everything, I have said and cited thus far, I am forced to conclude that Berry is not just wrong but wrong-headed in her approach to Nietzsche. It is a stunning display of insensitive readership to premise a book-length argument on the 'outright derision with which Nietzsche treats the concept of knowledge throughout his productive career' (3). 27Although she approaches the topic from a very different point of view - the ethics of care - Vrinda Dalmiya, 'Should a knower care?' Hypatia, 17 (Citation2002) No. 1: 36 also argues that what I am here calling sympathy is helpful to someone who wants to know what others want and how they feel

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