Speaking Softly Without Big Sticks

Meta‐Regulation and Public Sector Audit

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6090258
AutoresColin Scott (0000-0002-0486-8670, autor correspondente)
Ano2003
Volume25
Fascículo3
Páginas203-219
Data de publicação2003-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoLaw & Policy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0265-8240 • E-ISSN: 1467-9930
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9930.2003.00148.x
OpenAlexW2145361769
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas17
Referências citadas16

Australian government has undergone an “audit explosion” in the last twenty years. This article observes, first, that the constitutional function of public sector audit institutions (AIs) gives them a strong cultural commitment to the assessment of the regularity and legality of public expenditure. New functions connected with performance audit and evaluation of nonfinancial performance indicators are liable to be interpreted through the lens of these more traditional concerns. The second observation is that, if we think in terms of “regimes” of financial control, we find that AIs form only part of the overall regulatory regime. This calls into question the coherence and potential for effectiveness of regimes of financial control. However, AIs could also be conceived as “meta‐regulators” with the capacity to steer the self‐regulatory capacities of public sector organizations in respect of financial controls. Auditors may be effective as meta‐regulators through speaking softly, even though they demonstrably lack big sticks

Audit · Business · Control (management · Economics · Economy · Government (linguistics · Internal audit · Joint audit · Management · Performance audit · Political science · Principle of legality · Public interest · Public sector · Law · Public Policy and Administration Research · Public Procurement and Policy · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Accounting