Redundant Regulation

Sanctioning Broker‐Dealers

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6090779
AutoresPatricia Ewick (autor correspondente)
Ano1985
Volume7
Fascículo4
Páginas421-445
Data de publicação1985-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoLaw & Policy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0265-8240 • E-ISSN: 1467-9930
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9930.1985.tb00361.x
OpenAlexW2091361575
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas7
Referências citadas24

Using data from the SEC Docket this paper examines Securities and Exchange Commission administrative actions involving broker‐dealer violations, focusing on disparities in the sanctioning of individual and organizational defendants. The analysis shows that the overall severity of sanctions received by individuals and organizations is similar, but the determinants of sanctions differ substantially. For individual violators, conventional measures of culpability figure prominently into the sanctioning decision. For organizations, operational viability is the principal determinant of sanction. This reliance upon measures of viability renders much of the SEC's control of organizations redundant: the most severe sanctions are reserved for firms that are already operationally or financially moribund. This pattern of regulatory redundancy is interpreted as an alternative accommodation to the difficulties of sanctioning organizations

Business · Commission · Computer security · Culpability · Economics · Political science · Principal (computer security · Sanctions · Computer Science · Corruption and Economic Development · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Finance