Freud and the mind-brain problem

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6130147
AutoresStåle Gundersen (0000-0002-2959-0943, Department of Cultural Studies and Languages, Ståle Gundersen University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway, autor correspondente)
Ano2023
Volume46
Fascículo1-2
Páginas4-12
Data de publicação2023-07-03
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0106-2301 • E-ISSN: 1600-0803
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/01062301.2023.2286756
OpenAlexW4389326766
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas12

The author argues that we can better understand Freud’s perspective on the mind-brain problem by considering his Kantian view on natural scientific knowledge, namely that there is an essential limit to our knowledge of physical reality. This means that even though conscious states are identical with brain states, it is impossible to explain the events’ conscious properties physically. Further, it is argued that if Freud took an identity theory for granted, it is not fair to criticize him for attempting to construct neuro-psychological mechanistic explanations of psychoanalytic phenomena. It is concluded that Freud’s perspectives on consciousness, the mind-brain problem, and the nature of psychological explanation are philosophically sophisticated and interesting also from a contemporary point of view

Aesthetics · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Construct (python library) · Epistemology · Identity (music) · Natural (archaeology) · Perspective (graphical) · Psychoanalysis · Psychoanalytic theory · Computer Science · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology