Protest against the politicians
Vote switching in the Italian 2016-2020 constitutional referenda
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6164370 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Matthew E Bergman (0000-0001-8879-4615), Gianluca Passarelli (0000-0002-3300-0790) |
| Ano | 2021 |
| Volume | 84 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Páginas | 25-40 |
| Data de publicação | 2021-09-13 |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Quaderni dell Osservatorio elettorale QOE - IJES (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 2724-4679 • E-ISSN: 0392-6753 |
| Editora | Firenze University Press (PUBLISHER • IT) |
| DOI | 10.36253/qoe-10720 |
| OpenAlex | W3206038260 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 28 |
Referenda provide the opportunity for voters to express political economic protest and provide additional ways to support parties they vote for in elections. Alternatively, referenda also provide voters a chance to express their policy references in a way that does not affect which party will lead the government. The rejection of the 2016 Italian Constitutional referendum by 60% of voters and the approval the 2020 Italian Constitutional Referendum by 70% of voters could be a result of changing political economic conditions, influences related to partisanship and party leadership, or a change in approval of the reforms contained within the referendum. The article examines these possibilities in turn and then in a multivariate analysis. First, the overall change in economic discontent, satisfaction with the governing coalition and leaders, and belief in the content of the reforms between 2016 and 2020 will be examined. We also examine the how voters of each of the parties in the 2018 general election shifted on these variables. Then individual level analysis of consistent voters and switchers will assess the relative strength of partisanship, economic, political, and referendum-specific factors in convincing voters to switch their vote. We find that referendum-specific factors had the strongest predictive power followed by those related to government approval. Voters approved of the contents that would reduce the number of politicians in Italy and used the referendum to express support or displeasure with the incumbent’s policy programme. Our results contribute to the studies on second-order elections where voters are allowed for greater expressive preferences
Economics · General election · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Order (exchange · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Referendum · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Media Influence and Politics · Populism, Right-Wing Movements · Public Administration
Rejecting constitutional reform in the 2016 Italian referendum
Economic Voting in Direct Democracy
Personalization of Politics Between Television and the Internet
Making sense of Italy’s constitutional referendum
Italy says no
Mi Piace, ma Non Mi Piaci [I Like It, But I Don't Like You]
Multidimensional incongruence and vote switching in Europe
Referendums in times of discontent
Voting in the Dutch ‘Ukraine-referendum’
Uncorking the Bottle
The struggle over dimensionality
Nine Second‐order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results
Five Danish referendums on the European Community and European Union
Referendums on European Integration
Referendum on Renzi
The Blind Corner of Political Representation
Conflicting messages of electoral protest
Negativity and Political Behavior
Who Toes the Party Line? Cues, Values, and Individual Differences
Motivated Reasoning and Political Parties
Parties, conditionality and leader effects in parliamentary elections
The Five Star Movement
Issues and leaders as vote determinants
Coalition‐Targeted Duvergerian Voting
Decades of Party Distrust. Persistence through Reform in Italy
The Seat Product Model of the effective number of parties
Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate
Coalition-directed Voting in Multiparty Democracies
| Altamente citado | Não |
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